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about	 its	 impact,	 the	present	 study	demonstrates	 that	privatization	has	had	contradictory	 impacts,	
depending	on	which	country	is	concerned,	and	on	whether	small	or	large-scale	privatization	is	considered.	














































have	a	 significant	 impact,	unless	 the	budget	constraint	 is	hard	enough	and	 the	 legal	and	 institutional	
framework	of	a	country	permits	owners	 to	control	 their	 firms.	 In	 the	same	vein,	using	EBRD	transition	
indicators	for	large-scale	privatization,	governance	and	enterprises	restructuring	to	assess	reform,	Falectti	et	
al.	(2002)	found	that	although	contemporaneous	reforms	affect	growth	negatively	and	lagged	reform	does	so	






confused	with	 its	 level,	which	 is	 the	 topic	of	 this	paper),	 is	negatively	associated	with	growth,	and	 they	
underline	the	importance	of	legal	institutions	in	the	transition	process.














































































































GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
SSP	index -897.47 165.22 -5.43 0.00 -1224.49 -570.45
Imp	Exp	%GDP 18.53 5.39 3.44 0.00 7.86 29.19
FDI	inflows 31.94 45.02 0.71 0.48 -57.17 121.05
FDI	stock 71.88 19.51 3.68 0.00 33.27 110.48
Tertiary	enroll 154.16 16.06 9.60 0.00 122.37 185.94
Urban	pop -186.83 44.90 -4.16 0.00 -275.70 -97.95
Male	empl	rate 74.59 68.36 1.09 0.28 -60.72 209.89
Unempl -163.66 42.62 -3.84 0.00 -248.02 -79.30
Baltic	state -2884.59 750.18 -3.85 0.00 -4369.40 -1399.78
Early	reformer 4206.76 307.12 13.70 0.00 3598.88 4814.63
_cons 9596.81 6930.91 1.38 0.17 -4121.40 23315.02





yielded	a	significant	systematic	difference	 in	coefficients	 (p>.01),	a	 fixed	effects	 robust	standard	errors	
regression	was	run	next:
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GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
SSP	index -715.37 223.89 -3.20 0.02 -1244.77 -185.94
Imp	Exp	%GDP -0.83 6.28 -0.13 0.89 -15.69 14.03
FDI	inflows 1.19 57.57 0.02 0.98 -134.93 137.32
FDI	stock 78.78 16.49 4.78 0.00 39.78 117.78
Tertiary	enroll 168.96 11.23 15.05 0.00 142.41 195.51
Urban	pop -232.77 279.35 -0.83 0.43 -893.32 427.78
Male	empl	rate 178.87 127.51 1.40 0.20 -122.65 480.39
Unempl -199.88 67.39 -2.97 0.02 -359.25 -40.52
Baltic	state (omitted)













GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
D.SSP	index -706.24 139.22 -5.47 0.00 -962.14 -450.35
D.Imp	Exp	%GDP -0.80 1.89 -0.42 0.67 -4.56 2.96
D.FDI	inflows 8.88 13.76 0.65 0.52 -18.38 36.14
D.FDI	stock 1.94 9.01 0.22 0.83 -15.89 19.78
D.Tertiary	enroll 4.49 19.94 0.23 0.82 -34.98 43.98
D.Urban	pop -327.69 262.32 -1.25 0.21 -847.15 191.77
D.Male	empl	rate 83.95 52.39 1.60 0.11 -19.81 187.71
D.Unempl -110.37 28.99 -3.81 0.00 -167.78 -52.96































GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. t P	>	|t| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
logLSP	index 0.34 0.10 3.31 0.00 0.13 0.56
logImp	Exp	%GDP 0.15 0.13 1.18 0.25 -0.11 0.40
logFDI	inflows 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.93 -0.10 0.11
logFDI	stock -0.02 0.05 -0.46 0.65 -0.13 0.08
logTertiary	enroll 0.45 0.09 4.83 0.00 0.26 0.65
logUrban	pop 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.78 -0.47 0.62
logMale	empl	rate 0.82 0.56 1.46 0.15 -0.33 1.97
logUnempl -0.38 0.05 -7.55 0.00 -0.49 -0.28























Table 5.  Summary of the effects of country-group specific pooled OLS regressions.
Balkan Vishegrad Baltics
SSP No	effect Negative No	effect














i,t-1 + β1SSPi,t	 + β2Xi,t + μi,t	+	εi,t,	i	=	1,…,	8,	t	=	1,…,	20.	












































GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. z P	>	|z| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
GDP	per	cap
L1. 1.07 0.19 5.62 0.00 0.69 1.45
L2. -0.32 0.25 -1.27 0.20 -0.80 0.17
LSP
. 828.46 15.53 53.36 0.00 798.03 858.89
L1. -315.71 89.81 -3.52 0.00 -491.74 -139.68
























GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. z P	>	|z| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
GDP	per	cap
L1. 1.20 0.04 30.85 0.00 1.13 1.28
L2. -0.31 0.13 -2.30 0.02 -0.57 -0.05
SSP
. -52.69 6.29 -8.38 0.00 -65.01 -40.37
L1. 115.03 49.78 2.31 0.02 17.48 212.59
L2. -177.02 38.19 -4.63 0.00 -251.87 -102.16
4.3.3	 Dynamic	model:	Visegrad
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GDP	per	cap Coef. Robust	Std.	Err. z P	>	|z| [95%	Conf.	Interval]
GDP	per	cap
L1. 1.33 0.19 6.93 0.00 0.95 1.71
L2. -0.44 0.22 -1.96 0.05 -0.88 0.00
SSP
. 610.26 72.89 8.37 0.00 467.39 753.12
L1. -411.23 106.39 -3.87 0.00 -619.74 -202.71
L2. 256.25 74.16 -3.46 0.00 -401.61 -110.89
Table 9.  Summary of the effects of different variables in the dynamic models.
Batlics Balkans Visegrad
Contemp. Lagged Contemp. Lagged Contemp. Lagged
SSP No	effect No	effect Negative Ambiguous Positive Negative









have	had	a	more	direct	and	immediate	effect	on	GDP	than	in	the	rest	of	 the	countries	 in	 the	sample.	The	
results	obtained	for	 the	Visegrad	group	and	 the	Baltics	could	also	be	attributed	 to	a	simultaneity	 issue	
discussed	by	Falcetti	et	al.	(2006).	In	this	train	of	thought,	assuming	that	it	 is	economic	growth	that	drives	




of	 the	privatization	 took	place	 in	 the	 fast	 reformer	countries	 (the	early	1990s),	most	of	 them	actually	
experienced	negative	GDP	growth	 rates	 (except	Poland),	 and	 later	when	GDP	 started	 to	grow,	 the	
privatization	process	had	largely	been	completed	and	therefore	privatization	indices	remained	unchanged.	
This	suggests	a	 transition	from	negative	 to	no	effect	 to	a	potentially	positive	effect,	which	seems	 to	be	
supported	by	the	data	analysis.	Indeed,	comparing	the	effects	of	privatization	with	one	versus	two	lags	reveals	
that,	at	least	in	the	Visegrad	group,	a	quadratic	effect	of	privatization	seems	to	be	an	adequate	explanation	–	it	
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the	least	positive	impact	on	GDP	was	found	to	be	massive	giveaways.	Additionally,	Gouret	found	that	 the	














	 Finally,	 it	should	be	mentioned	that	data	on	GDP	can	lack	precision	in	transition	economies	due	to	 the	
substantial	size	of	 the	 informal	sector.	Hernández-Catá	(1997),	Johnson	et	al.	 (1997)	and	Kaufmann	and	
Kaliberda	(1996)	express	suspicions	that	the	official	national	accounts	in	transition	countries	underestimate	


















privatization	per se	 is	not	enough	to	generate	macroeconomic	performance	gains,	 the	main	findings	and	
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